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NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT BOARD DIRECTORS AND TRAINING
HOURS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF
TSEC ELECTRONIC COMPANIES
By Fu-Huei Yang
September, 2006
Abstract

In February 2002, the regulation of appointing independent directors in the
boardroom was set forth in "Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for
TSECIGTSM Listed Companies" (CGBPP).

Since the enactment of the amended

"Security and Exchange Act" in 2006, all listed companies are required to appoint
independent directors, not less than two in number and not less than one-fifth of the total
number of directors.
In addition to implementing the independent directors system, in order to enhance
director competencies and director behavior, the TSEC announced the "Guideline for
Promotion of Advanced Study by Directors and Supervisors of TSECIGTSM Listed
Companies."

In this guideline, a newly recruited director of TSEC listed companies is

advised to take at least 12 hours of training courses for the recruitment year, and at least 3
hours for each of the following years of tenure.
The purpose of this exploratory (comparative) and explanatory (correlational)
study was to examine the differences between the absence or presence of independent
directors on company performance of TSEC listed electronic companies, and the
relationship between the number of independent directors and the number of board
training hours and company performance of TSEC listed electronic companies.

In this study, independent directors were measured by the absence or presence of
the independent directors and their number in the boardroom.

Board members' training

was measured by the total training hours of the board. Company performance was
measured by financial indicators in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS. Findings indicated
that the presence of independent directors was associated with significantly higher
company's financial performance for TSEC electronic companies. Results of simple
regression analyses indicated that the number of board training hours significantly
explained about 1% of financial performance of TSEC listed electronic companies.
Results of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the number of independent
directors and the number of board of directors training hours were significant explanatory
variables of about 7% of financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC listed
electronic companies. Interpretations, implications, conclusions, and recommendations
for future study are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Introduction and Background to the Problem

The breakthrough news of corporate debacles such as the Enron and WorldCom
scandals has shocked industries, capital markets, and investors around the world in the
beginning years of the 21'' century.

People are suspicious of the effectiveness of

corporate governance. For the past two decades, the study of corporate governance "has
focused on the independence of directors and the separation of the CEO and chair"
(Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 1).
A vast amount of research demonstrates that there is no significant relationship

between director independence and corporate performance (Westphal, 2002; Bhagat &
Black, 2002). Nonetheless, after interviewing 194 corporate directors, regulators, and
shareholders about corporate governance, Leblanc and Gillies (2003) found most held the
view that "a relationship does exist between corporate governance and the financial
success of the corporation" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 1). Therefore, the missing link
between corporate governance and company performance is proposed to be board process
(referring to the board decision-making procedure) and effectiveness, rather than just
board structure (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).
According to Leblanc and Gillies, there are three pillars constituting an effective
board-board

structure, board membership, and board process.

Board structure is

analyzed "from the perspective of having a separate chair, a majority of outside directors,
and an optimal size" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 2). Moreover, the independence of
directors has been conventionally the most important issue associated with board

structure. Board membership is defined as "how directors come to be recruited onto a
board, the balanced competencies of existing members, and the methods that are taken to
remove a director from a board" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 7). Board process is
defined as "how directors make decisions and the behavior of the individual directors"
(Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 7).
"Nearly two decades of research find little evidence that board independence
enhances board effectiveness.

Studies have, however, found a negative effect"

(Westphal, 2002, p. 6). Therefore, Leblanc and Gillies (2003) propose a new model of
board effectiveness, and emphasize that a board of directors for its effectiveness "needs
to have the right board structure, supported by the right board membership, and engaged

in the right board processes" (p. 6). "An effective board must be built on a foundation
of members who are independent. But it must have two additional features" (p. 7).
Firstly, "it must be made up of members with the competencies required by the
corporation to fulfill its strategies and to meet its obligations" (p. 7). Secondly, "the
members must be able to work together to come to effective decisions" (p. 7).
Consequently, a board is only as effective as its directors. Three factors define the
effectiveness of a board member:

1) director independence; 2) director competencies;

and 3) director behavior (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).
Regulatory director independence can be easily accomplished by legislative
efforts. A survey of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) members also supported a trend toward the American model of corporate
governance. This has developed in recent years due to global competition in terms of
manufacturing industries or international capital markets (Nester & Thompson, 2001).

Moreover, "the OECD and the World Bank are committed to assisting governments in
evaluating and improving the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate
governance in their countries" (OECD, 2004, p. I).
The regulatory independence of directors has been widely adopted in different
kinds of corporate governance systems around the world since the passage and
enforcement of SOA, and the subsequent revised rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ stock
markets (NYSE, 2002 & NASDAQ, 2002). Wade (2002) stated, "I was surprised to find
discussions.. .that include corporate governance reform that moves Japan, Canada, and
Germany closer to the U.S. corporate governance paradigm" (p. 441).
For the other two factors of director competencies and director behavior, things
seem to be too complicated to incorporate them into individual companies only by
legislation. "The choice of directors is most often a result of the interaction among the
various actors" (Huse, 2005, p. 5). Measures of director competencies "include the
directors' general, functional, firm-specific and board-specific knowledge and skills.
Relational, social and intellectual capacity or capability may also be included as
competencies" (Huse, 2005, p. 5).
As reported by Huse (2005), Sundaramurthy and Lewis claimed the dynamism of
actual board behavior and corporate governance is rooted in various learning and
influencing loops. "The learning processes take place at various levels: societal and
institutional, organizational, group and individual" (Huse, 2005, p. 5).
In February 2002, the regulation of appointing independent directors in the
boardroom was set forth in "Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for
TSECIGTSM Listed Companies" (CGBPP). In order to reform Taiwan's corporate

governance system, the Taiwanese government organized "The Group for Implementing
Corporate Governance" (the -'Groupx) in July 2003 to review and promulgate the
amended version of CGBPP on December 3 1,2003 (TSEC, 2006). Until the enactment
of the amended "Security and Exchange Act" in 2006, all the listed companies are
required to appoint independent directors, not less than two in number and not less than
one-fifth of the total number of directors (Taiwan Security and Exchange Act, 2006).
Besides implementing the independent directors system, in order to enhance
director competencies and director behavior, the Taiwan Securities Exchange
Corporation (TSEC) drew up and promulgated amendatory reference samples of
"Procedures for Electing Directors and Supervisors," "Rules Governing the Conduct of
Shareholders Meeting," and "Organization Rules for Directors and Supervisors
Nomination Committee" (TSEC, 2006).

Additionally, to encourage directors'

continuous learning and training, TSEC conducted research and promulgated "Guideline
for Promotion of Advanced Study by Directors and Supervisors of TSECIGTSM Listed
Companies" (TSEC, 2006). In the guideline, a new recruited director of TSEC listed
companies is advised to take at least 12 hours training courses for the recruiting year, and
at least 3 hours for the following year of tenure.
The independent directors system and board training guideline are enacted to
enhance corporate governance effectiveness and company performance to avoid the
disasters of corporate scandals that cause investors' enormous losses and affect their
confidence in the investment market.

Thus, shareholders' confidence, the board's

accountability, and the securities market's fairness and justice can be restored and
protected as well. In this study, the independent directors system was examined to

confirm its impact on company's financial performance, and the board training provision
was examined to determine its relationship to company's financial performance.
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to examine the differences between the presence or
absence of independent directors on company performance of TSEC listed electronic
companies, and the relationship between board training and company performance of
TSEC listed electronic companies. The specific purposes of this quantitative
causal-comparative and correlational study were: (1) to determine if there is a significant
difference in company performance between two groups of listed Taiwanese electronic
companies either appointing independent directors, or not appointing independent
directors; (2) to examine the explanatory relationship between the number of independent
directors on company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS, in TSEC electronic
companies; (3) to examine the explanatory relationship between board members' training
and company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS in TSEC electronic
companies; and (4) to examine the explanatory relationship between the number of
independent board directors and the number of training hours and company performance
(ROA, ROE, and EPS).
Definition of Terms

Independent Variable: Independent Directors
Theoretical Definition
An independent director occurs when "the board of directors affirmatively
determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company, either
directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship

with the company" (NYSE, 2002, Section 303A, para. 1).

Operational Definition #I: Presence or Absence of Independent Directors
In this study, operational definition #1 of independent directors was defined by
the presence or absence of independent directors.
A-Secondary

Please refer to Appendix

Data of TSEC Website, (1, 0), which indicates if the listed company has

at least one independent director, or none (EXIND).

Operational Definition #2: Number of Independent Directors
In this study, for operational definition #2 of independent director was defined by
the number of independent directors.

Please refer to Appendix A (NOIND).

According to Market Open Posting System (M.O.P.S.) of TSEC, the largest number of
independent directors for all of the listed electronic companies is four, as of February 15,
2006.

Moreover, only one company had four independent directors. All of the other

listed electronic companies that had 0, 1, 2, or 3 independent directors were included in
the study.

Independent Variable: Board Training
Theoretical Definition
Forbes and Milliken (1999) characterize director's knowledge and skills which
may be obtained through training on two main dimensions: 1) business management
functional knowledge and skills, and 2) firm-specific knowledge and skills. Board
members of listed TSEC companies are advised by CGBP regulations to "participate in
training courses of finance, business, commerce, accounting or law, which cover subjects
relating to corporate governance upon becoming directors and throughout their terms of
occupancy" (CGBPP, 2002, Article 40 & 51, Chapter 111).

Operational Definition: Board Training Hours

In this study, to measure board training, all of the board members' training hours
taken through certified training institutions and reported to TSEC, were used for analysis.
Refer to Appendix A.

On M.O.P.S. of TSEC, board members' training hours are

disclosed, posted, and updated when they take the certified training courses regarding
corporate governance.
Dependent Variable: Company Financial Performance
Theoretical Definition

Indicators of good company performance are defined financially in terms of sales,
return on assets (ROA), and market value (Colley, Doyle, Logan, & Stettinius, 2003).
Company performance may also include addressing interests of political and social
constituents (Detomasi, 2002; Salacuse, 2002).
Operational Definition (ROA, ROE, EPS)

In this study, three commonly-used measures of a company's financial
performance are: return on total assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earning per
share (EPS). Refer to Appendix A. Data were collected from M.O.P.S. of the TSEC
website for the individual company's financial analysis.

Justification
This study is justified by considering its significance, contributions to empirical
validity of theories, the extent to which it is a researchable topic, and the feasibility of
this study. This study has the potential to contribute to the implementation of corporate
governance regulation, to board training, and to the effectiveness of boards of directors
for Taiwan's listed companies.

This study fills research gaps of empirical studies examining the effect of
independent directors on company performance in Taiwan, and the relationship between
board training and company performance in the literature of corporate governance. The
board members of listed companies are advised to take training courses accumulated by
hours (TSEC, 2006). These training hours are regarded as significant information,
which is to be disclosed to the public.

Therefore, to examine its relationship to

company performance is beneficial for confirming the effect of this government
regulation on corporate governance. The board of directors of listed companies is
required to appoint at least two independent directors in the boardroom (Company Act,
2006, Chapter V, Section 4). Therefore, the number of independent directors in the

boardroom is recognized as being beneficial to corporate governance and company
performance.

It is also significant to examine the validity of this regulation on company

performance.
This study was feasible because it could be implemented in a reasonable amount
of time, and reliable data was available on the official website.

Variables in the

theoretical frameworks were able to be explored.
Delimitations and Scope
1. Research of independent directors and company performance is limited to the listed
electronic public companies in Taiwan, which has a hybrid corporate governance
model but approaching the American market model.

Additionally, they are

attributed to high-tech industries, which are currently recognized as the most
important industries in Taiwan, and have the similarity of board functions and
dynamics (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).

2. In this study, the target population was limited to the electronic public companies
currently listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC). As of August 9,
2006, there were 304 electronic companies listed on TSEC (TSEC, 2006).
3. This study examined the effect of independent directors, because the exercise of the

board of directors in Taiwan is approaching the American model, which has directors
in the boardroom only.
Chapter I provided an introduction to the study about the relationship between the
number of independent board directors and training hours and financial performance of
TSEC electronic companies.

This introduction section discussed the problem of

corporate governance scandals around the world in the twenty-first century, and the
background of corporate governance systems and reforms in Taiwan. The purpose of
the study relating to the implementation of independent directors and board directors'
training was described. Definitions of terms both theoretical and operational definitions
presented for each variable were defined. The delimitations of the study were also
identified. The study was justified because of its significance, researchability, and
feasibility. Chapter I1 presents the literature review, theoretical framework, research
question and hypotheses identified for this study about corporate governance, board
effectiveness, independent directors, board training and corporate governance reforms in
Taiwan.

CHAPTER I1
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH
QUESTION, AND HYPOTHESES
Introduction

In the beginning years of the 21Stcentury, the breakthrough news of corporate
debacles such as the Enron and WorldCom scandals has shocked industries, capital
markets, and investors around the world. For decades, business failures have not been
absent from the business headlines; however, none were like these. They resulted in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), as well as the subsequent renewal regulations at the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ stock markets.
Since the financial crises in East Asia (1997-98) and the legislation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the American market system of corporate governance is evolving all
over the world (Heeren & Rickers, 2003). According to Banks (2004), three models of
corporate governance (the marker model, the relationship model, and the hybrid model)
exist in numerous countries.

These corporate governance systems have different

strengths and weaknesses. Among many important issues of corporate governance,
independent directors and board independence is one of the most critical and most talked
about topics.
A vast amount of research has demonstrated that there is no significant
relationship between director independence and corporate performance. Instead, board
process (referring to the board decision-making procedure) is proposed to be the key
factor of company performance (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003).
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a state-of-the-art review of theoretical

literature and empirical studies about corporate governance, boards of directors, and the
relationship between independent directors and company performance and board training,
to examine factors that may have a positive impact on board effectiveness or company
performance, to identify problem areas that negatively influence the effectiveness of
independent directors, to identify strategies that promote better board process and
effective govemance, and to identify areas for future scholarly inquiry. Moreover, to
examine current implementation of corporate governance in Taiwan, the literature
regarding to government regulation were purposefully reviewed.
Review of the Literature
Introduction to Corporate Governance

In the early years of 21St century the breakthrough news of corporate debacles
such as the Enron, Tyco and WorldCom scandals have shocked industries, capital
markets, and investors around the world. For decades, business failures have never been
absent the business headlines; however, none were like these. They resulted in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), as well as the subsequent regulations at the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ stock markets.
Origin of Corporate Governance

All of a sudden, corporate governance has caught the world's eyes, in the U.S.,
European countries, and newly developed Asian countries-wherever
corporations and stock markets.

there are

Corporate governance relates to a corporation and its

shareholders, and has re-emerged as one of the most significant business topics of early
21st century (Banks, 2004).
Corporate govemance has been commonly recognized as a public policy issue in

the United States. This idea finds its origin in Berle and Means' classical theory of
agency problems, summarized by Salacuse (2002) as "how could corporate managers. as
agents of shareholders, be induced to manage corporate assets in the best interests of their
principals" (p. 4)?
Although Berle and Means' agency problem has not changed, institutional
investors have become more prevalent due to privately funded U.S. retirement systems.
"Many Europeans consider the traditional American definition of corporate governance,
with its central preoccupation on protecting shareholder rights and interests, to be too
narrow" (Salacuse, 2002, p. 475).

From the European perspective, therefore, the

purposes of corporate governance are supposed to be: to take social responsibility, to
protect shareholders' interests, to promote economic growth, to attract international
capital, to aid in company growth and sustainability, and to enhance company
performance (Detomasi, 2002; Salacuse, 2002).

Corporate Governance Systems
In 2004, Banks introduced his contemporary theory of corporate governance
models, based on his qualitative phenomenological studies about different types of
shareholding structure (concentrated or diffuse), use of various governance mechanisms
(internal and external), as well as relationship and interest focuses (long-term or
short-term).

The theory generalized three major corporate governance models: the

market model, the relationship model, and the hybrid model. In addition to governance
models, Banks classified two different types of boards of directors: the single board
system and the dual board system (Banks, 2004). This theory is socially significant,
addressing essential issues in the discipline of corporate governance, and is useful in

explaining and discriminating among those with different internal and external
governance characteristics.

The market model. This model is executed in the U. S., UK, Australia, Canada,
and several other countries.

It features very diffuse shareholdings, liquid capital

markets, dynamic capital reallocation, advanced legal and regulatory frameworks, and an
active market for corporate control. At the internal governance level, management's
power is in excess of the board, they focus on investments that can maximize enterprise
value and the stock price, particularly over the short run.

Shareholders are commonly

known as the primary stakeholders (Banks, 2004).

The relationship model. This model is found in Japan, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and France, among others, and is characterized by more concentrated
ownership stakes and cross-shareholdings, moderately liquid capital markets, less active
capital reallocation, and less corporate control activity.

Regulatory processes are strong;

although legal frameworks exist, they are often replaced (or at least supplemented) by
informal negotiation arising from long-term business relationships. At the internal
governance level, company management is monitored by the board in form. However,
in practice, it is overseen by main banks, or large company or family shareholders. In
addition, management is not forced by the stock price to make risky investments for
maximizing short-term interests of the individual and the company.
management seems not to be accountable to the shareholders.

As a result,

Therefore, primary

stakeholders are practically employees rather than shareholders by law (Banks, 2004).

The hybrid model. This model is found in various developing nations (such as
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and Mexico).

It combines significant

characteristics of the relationship model with dimensions of the market model. but still
has certain unique elements of its own. For example, capital markets are illiquid, the
market for corporate control is either inactive or nonexistent, and regulatory and legal
frameworks are often in an early stage. At the internal governance level, interests of
families, related enterprise conglomerates, banks, and the government as a whole or
individual officials are interwoven and interdependent on each other. Although some of
the elements of this model have changed since the late 1990s (such as less linkage with
conglomerates and political forces), many of the characteristics remain unchanged
(Banks, 2004).

The single board system
directors-generally

Under a single board system, the board of

nominated on an individual basis through an internal committee

and/or executive management recommendations, and elected by shareholders-acts

as an

independent monitor of company management. The board, headed by the chairperson,
typically includes 10 to 20 directors. It is commonly used by companies in countries
such as the U.S., Canada, the UK, Japan and Korea. In some countries the chairperson
also serves as CEO and thus performs two distinct functions, managing the board of
directors and the executive team, a role that has the potential of leading to conflicts of
interest (Banks, 2004).

The dual board system

The dual board system consists of two bodies: the

supervisory board and the management board.

The supervisory board is roughly

equivalent to the board of directors, and is headed by a chairperson corresponding to the
chairperson of the board under the single board system.
independent oversight of company management.

It is responsible for

Specifically, the supervisory board,

acting as agent of the shareholders, is responsible for appointing, supervising and
advising members of the management board, and developing fundamental corporate
strategy. The management board is equivalent to the executive management team in
companies, and is headed by a chairperson corresponding to the CEO in the single board
system.

This system is commonly used by companies in Germany, Austria, the

Netherlands, and certain other continental European countries (Banks, 2004).
The Prevailing Market Model

A more detailed but narrow definition of corporate governance employed by
market practitioners is "Corporate governance is the system of rules and institutions that
determine the control and direction of the corporation and that define relations among the
corporation's primary participants-the

shareholders, boards of directors, and company

management" (Salacuse, 2002, p. 473). This definition has been the primary public
issue related to corporate governance in the U.S. and many other countries with a similar
governance system, such as the U.K., Canada, and Australia.
Founded upon this definition, corporate governance in the U.S. strengthens the
protection of shareholder rights and the maximization of shareholder return. "At a
micro level . . . management is very focused on investments with measurable returns that
seek to maximize enterprise value and the stock price, particularly over the short run.
Shareholders are widely recognized as the primary stakeholders" (Banks, 2004, p. 26).
Since the financial crises in East Asia (1997-98) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
American market system of corporate governance has been evolving all over the world.
For example, "The German Federal Government and the High Level Group of Company
Law Experts

. . . have recently published proposals to foster the development of deep and

liquid GermanIEuropean capital markets. The proposed regulation shows remarkable
resemblances to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002" (Heeren & Rickers, 2003, p. 595). In
addition, "Japanese corporate law is undergoing a transition with new Commercial Code
amendments in 2003 that allow corporations to opt for an Anglo-American model of
governance" (Sarra & Nakahigashi, 2002, p. 299).

Furthermore and interestingly

enough, "China is establishing its corporate governance structures by emulating the
stylized Anglo-American model.

However, the country does not yet have the necessary

formal and informal institutions, or the financial infrastructure to make these structures
work effectively" (Tam, 2002, p. 303).
Soederberg (2003) wrote a theoretical paper, explaining how and why corporate
governance has become standardized, and questions whose interests are being served.
He concluded that the imposed standardization, by the International Monetary Funds'
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), drawing on the
Anglo-American model, serves two goals: "to stabilize the international financial system
in a neo-liberal open market economy, and to emphasize shareholder value and protect
the interests of institutional investors based in market-centric systems such as that of the

U.S." (Soederberg, 2003, p. 10).
Trend of Convergence in Global Corporate Governance Systems

Consider the renewal examples of corporate governance regulation in Germany,
Japan and China with different governance systems from the American model. Do they
indicate that there is a trend of convergence in global corporate governance systems?
Opinions vary, no definite result is apparent. For the present, it may be useful to more
closely examine some important features of these corporate governance systems.

According to Detomasi (2002), there are three elements which contribute to
effective corporate governance: "(I) a strong public sector's govemance regulations, (2)
an internal govemance mechanism in individual companies, and (3) well-trained
independent auditors to perform neutral and objective auditing practices of corporate
behavior" (Detomasi, 2002, p. 421).
The three models of corporate governance (the market model, the relationship
model, and the hybrid model) exist in numerous countries. They vary in terms of capital
market liquidity, legal framework, and shareholder diffusion.

However, not all the

countries, especially the developing countries, have the same elements of executing
effective corporate governance (Tam, n.d., p. 303). Even in the developed countries,
other differences still exist, such as Japan's bank-centered mutual ownership stakes and
in Germany's labor representatives on the "supervisory" board (Charkham, 1994).
These corporate governance systems have different strengths and weaknesses.
Detomasi (2002) reported that Fort and Schipani argued global market competition will
lead the governance model to the American market model, since it emphasizes corporate
performance, especially in lowering costs over the long run. Additionally, the flow of
international capital should force the convergence to the American system. Furthermore,
"the

American system emphasizes innovation, tolerates

failure, and fosters

entrepreneurial activity, but the Geman and Japanese systems are often accused of
stifling in these" (Detomasi, 2002, p. 431). Nestor and Thompson (2001) have shared
the same point of view as well.
Conversely, Detomasi (2002) also reported Roe's argument that German and
Japanese governance systems have been praised for their strengths in company's

sustainability and superiority "for long-term planning, as well as their coordinating ability
to include stakeholder concerns within the decision-making process through structured
interaction between the CEO and other stakeholders" (Detomasi, 2002, p. 431).
Moreover, Nye has argued "the American demand for increased quarterly shareholder
return and the practice of reimbursing board members in stock may encourage financial
manipulation and cause oversight corruption, both of which featured prominently in the
fall of Enron" (as cited in Detomasi, 2002, p. 43 1).
Among these pros and cons, Salacuse (2002), through reviewing some statistical
studies on the dispersed share-holding issue, explored the link between culture and
corporate governance to speculate on the possibilities for convergence of corporate
governance systems in the future. The difference in the concentration of shareholder
ownership between the U.S., the U.K., and the European continent, is amazing. For
example, Salacuse (2002) reported a study by Mayer among 1,309 corporations listed on
the NYSE and 2,83 1 corporations on the NASDAQ found that the median size of block
holding by an investor group was less than the minimum required disclosure level of 5
percent. Additionally, Salacuse (2002) reported a U.K. study by Barca and Becht found
that out of 1,926 listed companies, less than 3% had shareholders with majority control.
As reported by Salacuse (2002) the study by Mayer indicated, on the other hand, in 50%
of listed companies in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy, a single investor or related
group of investors controlled more than 50 percent of voting stock, and that 50 percent of
listed companies in the Netherlands, France, Spain and Sweden, a single block holder (an
individual or related group of investors) controlled more than 43.5%, 20%, 34.5%, and
34% respectively, of voting rights. According to Mayer "share ownership and therefore

voting power in publicly traded corporations is more concentrated in Europe than it is in
the United States and the U.K. In addition, a larger percentage of the population is
shareholders in the U.S. than in European countries . . . the New York Times reported
that one half of all American adults directly or indirectly own corporate shares, while
only one in five Gennans is a shareholder" (as cited in Salacuse, 2002, p. 474).
Salacuse (2002) concluded that corporate governance systems, like a society's
other important institutions, are not easily replaced due to the cultural differences and
various value concepts.

Consequently, one cannot assume that American values of

individualism will replace European attachment to community values any time soon.
"Finally a middle ground, a point of convergence between the pure shareholder model
advanced by Americans and the extreme stakeholder model advocated by Europeans,
may reside in the notion of socially responsible corporate governance, which seeks to
bring together two important themes together: good governance and social responsibility"
(Salacuse, 2002, p. 476).
Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness
Important Issues of Corporate Governance

The second element leading to effective corporate governance has been depicted
as strong internal governance practices of companies themselves, performed by a
community of well-trained managers and executives. Before discussing this subject in
more detail, the four important Standard & Poors' Rating Criteria related to corporate
governance are illustrated initially:
(1) Ownership-transparency

of ownership; concentration and influence of

ownership;

(2) Financial stakeholder relations-regularity

of, ease of, access to, and

information on shareholder meetings; voting and shareholder meeting
procedures; ownership rights (registration and transferability, equality or
ownership right);
(3) Financial transparency and information disclosure-type

of public disclosure

standards adopted; timing of, and access to, public disclosure; independence and
standard of auditors; and
(4) Board and management structure and process-board

structure and composition;

role and effectiveness of board; role and independence of outsider directors;
board and executive compensation, evaluation and succession policies (Standard
& Poors, Rating Criteria, 2004, p. 115).

These issues all interact and weave together to result in governance effectiveness
and company performance. In this literature review, the fourth criterion regarding board
and management structure and process is examined closely. First of all, definitions of
related terms of interest in the topic are described next.

Board structure. Maassen describes board structure as an element of "board
organization; the role of subsidiary boards in holding companies; board committees; the
formal independence of one-tier and two-tier boards; and the leadership of boards and the
flow of information between board structures" (as cited in Kakabadse, Kakabadse &
Kouzmin, 2001, p. 2).

Usually, a definition of board structure is "seen from the

perspective of having a separate chair, a majority of outside directors, and an optimal
size" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 3).

Board composition. Zahra and Pearce, and Maassen refer to board composition
in terms of "the size of the board and the mix of different director's demographics

(insiders/outsiders, malelfemale, foreign/local) and the degree of affiliation directors have
with the corporations" (as cited in Kakabadse et al., p. 2).

Board characteristics.

According to Hambrick, and Zabra and Pearce's

definition, "board characteristics encompass director's backgrounds, such as director's
experience; tenure; functional background; independence; stock ownership and other
variables that influence director's interests and their performance" (as cited in Kakabadse
et al., p. 2). Sometimes, these characteristics are called "board demography" (Forbes &
Miliken, 1999, p. 490), or "board membership" as defined by Leblanc and Gillies (2003),
which means "how directors come to be recruited onto a board, the balanced
competencies of existing members, and the methods that are taken to remove a director
from a board" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 6).

Board process.

Usually, board process is defined as "how directors make

decisions and the behavior of the individual directors themselves" (Leblanc & Gillies,
2003).

Board effectiveness. Board effectiveness can be conceptualized as "a function
of overall contribution of the board to organization, standard of support provided by the
board to the organization, individual contribution of directors to the organization, board
dynamics, board performance evaluation and review" (Ingley & van der Walt, 2003, p.
2).

Company performance.

Indicators of good company performance are defined

financially in terms of sales, return on assets (ROA), and market value (Colley, et al.,
2003). These are applicable broadly in the American market model. As indicated by
Detomasi (2002) and Salacuse (2002), from the European perspective, the purposes of

corporate governance include addressing interests of political and social constituents.
Therefore, financial performance measurement is just one of the purposes in the other
two corporate governance models. To emphasize, in this review, company performance is
measured by financial indicators only.

Independent Directors and Board Independence
Corporate debacles such as the Enron and WorldCom scandals have shocked
industries, capital markets, and investors around the world.

The present crisis of

investor confidence is due to "a breach of fiduciary duty by the trustees of the investors'
interests, namely the board of directors and management. A passive, non-independent,
and rubber-stamping board of directors made up of members selected by the CEO or
chairman of the board is not a guarantee of effective oversight of management actions
and conduct" (Colley, et al., 2004, p. 23). Thus, independent directors and board
independence are continually discussed and considered the most important issues in
solving corporate governance problems.
Independent directors are those that "the board of directors affirmatively
determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company (either
directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship
with the company)" (NYSE, 2003, p. 10).

Hence, outside directors may not be

independent; but independent directors must be outsiders. However, in practice, outside
directors are mostly independent.
Board independence regulations are ruled by NYSE-pursuant

to the SOA of

2002, and submitted to the Securities Exchange Commission: "Listed companies must
have a majority of independent directors" (NYSE, 2003, p. 10).

An operational

definition of board independence developed by Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) uses two
measures in their research: "First is OUTDIR, which is the number of outside unaffiliated
directors as a percentage of all directors in the board ....the second is RELTENR, is the
average tenure of outside directors as a ratio of the tenure of the CEO" (p. 34).
Are independent directors and board independence so important to the
enhancement of board process and board effectiveness, and thus to the company
performance? Researchers have developed propositions, and empirically examined their
relationships for decades among different industries.
Westphal(1999) conducted a study of board independence and firm performance.
He used a non-experimental, causal comparative quantitative design, analyzing data by
least squares multiple regressions analysis to examine the relationships of CEO-board
social ties, board involvement, and company performance.

Westphal's literature review

was thorough, current and interpretive in comparing and contrasting theories of how
CEO-board relationships influence board involvement in corporate governance. The
sample of 600 companies was randomly selected from the Forbes 1,000 index of U.S.
industrial and service firms. Data collection was implemented using questionnaires.
Several steps were taken to prevent duplicated replies of the same respondent. Through
deliberate design ensuring the responses, the author finally had a response rate of 44%
@=263) for CEOs and 43% (N=564) for directors. Hypotheses were tested using the
original respondents mentioned (Westphal, 1999).
Westphal (1999) conducted a pretest using in-depth pilot interviews with 22 top
managers and board members to strengthen the construct validity of the instrument.
Multiple response formats were used for reducing response bias, and items for measuring

each construct were spread throughout the survey.

Westphal (1999) examined

inter-rater reliability by comparing CEO and outside director responses on the monitoring
and cooperation items, and calculating Kappa coefficients for each item.
To assess dependent variables of company performance, the Westphal (1999)
used two measures, return on equity (accounting-based) and market-to-book value
(market-based). To measure the independent variable of the portion of the board
appointed after the CEO was appointed, it was calculated "as the number of outside
directors appointed during a CEO's tenure, divided by the total number of outsiders"
(p.6). "To assess the level of CEO-board friendship ties, CEOs were asked to consider
their personal relationships with other board members.. .. the current number of perceived
friendships was then divided by the total number of outside board members" (Westphal,
1999, p. 7).
To assess CEO incentive alignment, two measures were used: First, CEO
ownership was measured as the number of common shares owned by the CEO, divided
by the total amount of common stock outstanding.

Second, long-term incentive plan

compensation indicated the extent to which CEO compensation was contingent upon the
achievement of specific performance goals. It was calculated as the total value of
long-term incentive grants made in the year prior to the survey date divided by total
compensation in that year. In addition, several control variables were considered and
included in the analyses (Westphal, 1999).
Westphal acknowledges several limitations in the study.

First, his research

focused on advising interactions initiated by CEOs. Nevertheless, board-initiated advice
giving does occur, and it could become a more significant form of involvement in the

future. Second, his study did not address the specific content or quality of board advice.
Finally, he did not investigate how board collaboration and control affected a board's
ability to perform certain external roles. Therefore, he suggested future study examine
how CEO-board cooperation and control affect a board's ability to exercise its other
functions, how different kinds of CEO-board relationships are perceived by internal and
external stakeholders, and the consequences of these relationships for organizational
legitimacy. Additionally, this study also suggested new directions for research on
management incentives (Westphal, 1999).
Westphal's study shows ';how and when a lack of social independence (active
social ties of board members and top management) can increase board involvement and
firm performance by raising the frequency of advice and counsel interactions between the
CEO and outside directors" (p. 7). Additionally, Westphal's study explains how CEOs
and outside directors collaborate in the strategic decision making process, and
demonstrates that such collaboration independently and positively contributes to firm
performance. Furthermore, the findings suggest that future research should examine
how CEO-board cooperation and control affect a board's ability to exercise its other
major functions, including its role in managing resource dependence and in enhancing
organizational legitimacy.

The findings may also suggest new directions for research on

management incentives based on the confirmed interactions between incentive alignment
and social ties (Westphal, 1999).
Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) conducted secondary analyses and correlational
designs of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to examine the relationship between
board independence and company performance.

They used two separate models (a

single equation approach and a simultaneous equation system) to examine how board
independence, CEO characteristics and ownership structure influence performance. The
data were collected from the 1999 Proxy statements and the SNL Database for traded
equity REITs. They adopted two proxies, OUTDIR and RELTENR, to measure board
independence, and using a simultaneous equations method to analyze the collected data
(Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003).
Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) concluded that greater representation by outside
directors on REIT boards enhances performance, although the relationship is weak.
Their research contributes first by attempting "to explore the determinants of board
structure in the REIT world.

Second, it develops a comprehensive model to examine the

impact of board structure on company performance" (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003, p.17).
Specifically, researchers adjusted "for several control variables including the size of the
firm and market-to-book ratio, in order to control their intervening influence on the
outcome variable of company performance" (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003, p.17).
Bhagat and Black (2002) found a reasonably strong inverse relationship between
company performance and board independence, indicating no evidence that greater board
independence leads to improved firm performance. The study was a large-sample,
longitudinal empirical study of whether the degree of board independence correlates with
various measures of the long-term performance of large American firms. The study was
comprehensive in terms of methodology used, such as their sampling plan (data on board
composition were from a database of 957 large U.S. public corporations; data of the
sample firms' financial performance were from Compustat), analysis (ordinary least
squares and simultaneous equations methods), tests for entry and exit bias, performance

variables, and control variables (Bhagat & Black, 2002).
The most valuable conclusions reported by Bhagat and Black were five possible
theoretical explanations as to why the traditional wisdom favors highly independent
boards was not supported. (1) Independent directors need more incentives. (2) Today's
independent directors aren't independent enough. (3) Some directors are beholden to the
company or its current CEO in ways too subtle to be captured in customary definitions of
independence. (4) Some types of independent directors may be valuable, while others are
not. (5) Independent directors can add value, but only if they are embedded in an
appropriate committee structure (Bhagat & Black, 2002, p. 260).
Impact of Board Structure and Board Process on Board Effectiveness

Leblanc and Gillies (2003) reported several empirical studies in their review of
the literature, and concluded that the evidence from these studies indicates that
independence is not a major factor in corporate performance. They conducted a
qualitative study of director independence and company performance through
interviewing 200 directors on 21 boards and committees. Although the full methodology
was not presented in the article, the 194 subjects interviewed included regulators,
shareholders (both institutional and retail) and corporate directors (who constitute the
majority of respondents).

The findings were that a vast majority of respondents were

"ovenvhelmingly of the view that a relationship does exist between corporate governance
and the financial success of the corporation.

In other words, the directors interviewed

believe that better boards make for better companies.

Yet researchers, at least with

respect to board structure, have not been able to prove this" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p.
1).

Based on this study, Leblanc and Gillies developed "the board effectiveness"
rather than "the board structure" approach to corporate governance reform.

They

claimed "The fact is that in spite of all the discussion, writing and analysis, there has not
been a great deal of research on how boards actually work, how they make decisions, or
on how directors interact with each other" (Leblanc & Gilles, 2003, p. 5 ) . As a result,
they developed a new schematic model of board effectiveness (Leblanc & Gilles, 2003).
In the model, "it is board effectiveness, not board structure that must be analyzed,
for it is the effectiveness of the board in the decision-making process that finally
determines corporate performance" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 6). Furthermore, Leblanc
and Gilles explain that "an effective board must be built on a foundation of members who
are independent" @. 6). Additionally, "it must be made up of members with the
competencies required by the corporation to fulfill its strategies and to meet its
obligations, and the members must be able to work together to come to effective
decisions" (p. 6). Leblanc and Gillies (2003) refer to these three dimensions as "the
right board structure

. . ., the right board membership . . ., and the right board process" (p.

6). Their schematic and interactive relationships are shown in Figure 1.

Board Effectiveness

-

( n i s model is based on a swdy of twenry-one boards and committees in action and
interviewswith almost 200 directors. For a full discussion ofthe methodology used
in the study, please see R. Lebianc's J.Giiiies'forrhcoming book.)

Figure 1. Board effectiveness model by Richard Leblanc and James Gillies.
From "The Coming Revolution in Corporate Governance." by Richard Leblanc and James Gillies. Reprint # 9B03TE03, lvey Business
Journal, SeptemberIOctober 2003, p. 9. Copyright 2003 by h e y Management Services Inc. Reprinted with permission.

(See

Appendix B).

Leblanc and Gillies (2003) define board membership as "how directors come to
be recruited onto a board, the balanced competencies of existing members, and the
methods that are taken to remove a director from a board (e.g., director tenure or
retirement) (p. 6). According to Leblanc and Gillies, board process is defined as "how
directors make decisions and the behavior of the individual directors themselves" (p.7).
Their interactions based on the behavioral characteristics are the most important factor in
the board process. Finally, Leblanc and Gillies conclude that "the missing link in
establishing the relationships between board structure, board membership and corporate
performance may be an understanding of the activity called board process" (Leblanc &
Gillies, 2003, p. 7).

Leblanc and Gillies (2003) examined Westphal's (1999) empirical studies and
conclusion, which led to the new model of board effectiveness that emphasizes its
influence on company performance rather than director independence. This theory is
socially significant, addressing essential issues about corporate governance in practice,
and is useful in closing the gap of director independence and company performance.
Effective Board Process and Goals of Board Process
Criteria of Board Effectiveness and a Model of Board Processes

Leblanc and Gillies' (2003) view of the board process as "group interacting
behavior" (p.6) corresponds to the views of Forbes and Milliken (1999), who developed
"a model of board processes by integrating the literature on boards of directors with the
literature on group dynamics and workgroup effectiveness" (p. 489).

Drawing on

theories about small-group decision-making, Forbes and Milliken developed a schematic
model about three critical board processes and two board-level outcomes that are viewed
as mediators of the relationships between commonly studied aspects of board
demography and company performance.

The model is concerned with two criteria of

board effectiveness: "(1) board task performance, defined as the board's ability to
perform its control and service tasks effectively, and (2) the board's ability to continue
working together, as evidenced by the cohesiveness of the board" (Forbes & Milliken,
1999, p. 492). Furthermore, Forbes and Milliken proposed three board processes with
significant influence on a board's task performance and cohesiveness: effort norms,
cognitive conflicts, and the board's use of its knowledge and skills.

In the Forbes and Milliken model, board task performance represents the degree
to which boards succeed in fulfilling their control and service tasks.

Specific board

activities of the control task include decisions regarding the hiring, compensation, and
replacement of the firm's top management, as well as the approval of major initiatives
proposed by management. Specific activities of the service task include providing
expertise and detailed insight for strategic planning, such as a merger & acquisition, or
restructuring (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). "Board cohesiveness refers to the degree to
which board members are attracted to each other and are motivated to stay on the board
( p 494).
Forbes and Milliken's model of board processes was based on their qualitative,
phenomenological studies about small group decision-making. This theory identifies
three major constructs+ffort
knowledge-which

norms, cognitive conflicts, and the board's use of its

will significantly influence a board's task performance and

cohesiveness. This theory is socially significant, addressing essential issues about board
effectiveness in the discipline of corporate governance, and is useful in explaining,
predicting, and discriminating among those with board task performance and
cohesiveness or not. Thus it is a well-developed guide to board effectiveness and
corporate governance.

Theoretically, this model of board processes enforces and

complements the missing link between corporate governance and company performance
noted by Leblanc and Gillies (2003).
In addition, Forbes and Milliken (1999) characterized knowledge and skills on
two main dimensions: (1) business management functional knowledge and skills, and (2)
firm-specific knowledge and skills. In case of the presence of these capabilities, boards
still need the cohesiveness to share and use them. In concluding their observations
regarding the effects of board processes, Forbes and Milliken (1999) provide four

propositions to guide future scholarly research.
Proposition 1 :

Board effort norms, cognitive conflict, and the use of knowledge
and skills will be positively related to board task performance.

Proposition 2:

Cognitive conflict will be negatively related to board
cohesiveness.

Proposition 3a: Board cohesiveness will be related in a curvilinear manner to
board task performance.
Proposition 3b: The relationship between cohesiveness and board task
performance will be moderated by cognitive conflict-that

is,

cohesiveness will be less likely to detract from board task
performance when the board has a high level of cognitive
conflict.
Proposition 4:

,

The degree ofjob-related diversity ori the board will be
positively related to the presence of functional area knowledge
and skills and cognitively related to the board's cohesiveness
and its use of its knowledge and skills. (p. 497-499)

Goals of Board Process
In order to demonstrate the effect of the "usual suspects" (positive relationship
between board composition and company performance) approach to corporate
governance, Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) conducted two descriptive statistical tests in
their study of board independence and company performance. Although no significant
differences were found in Finkelstein and Mooney's study about the "usual suspects"
between high and low performers, they still presented their results, through 32 structured

interviews with members of corporate boards, on how to actually make the board work
better. The focus was on the board process. In addition to Forbes and Milliken's'
theoretical model, they concluded that "board effectiveness requires five interrelated
process goals to be realized: (I) Engage in constructive conflict; (2) Avoid destructive
conflict; (3) Work together as a team; (4) Know the appropriate level of strategic
involvement; and (5) Address decisions comprehensively (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003,
p. 106). Based on the statistical findings and their interviews with board directors,
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) suggested an action plan and considered that these
recommendations will be helpfhl in advancing more than one process goal, and, in some
cases, addressed all five goals.

Corporate Governance in Taiwan
According to Banks' (2004) classification, Taiwan's corporate governance system
can be attributed to the hybrid model, which is found in various developing nations, and
contains significant elements of the relationship model, but also includes dimensions of
the market model and certain unique characteristics of its own. Regarding the structure
of board of directors, there must be two supervisors at least who can oversee the company
independently in addition to directors (Company Act, 2006, Chapter V, Section 4 & 5).
However, in the Securities and Exchange Act (2006), the setting of supervisors can be
replaced by establishing an audit committee constituted by directors that direct the
Taiwan's operations of the board toward the market model of the United States.

Corporate Governance System of Taiwan
The basic legal framework in Taiwan to implement corporate governance includes
three components (TSEC, 2006):

1. Company law is the regulatory foundation of corporate governance. The roles of
shareholders' meeting, board of directors and supervisors regulated in the Company
Act were designed to achieve the objective of corporate governance through checks
and balances.
2. The administration and supervision of the offering, issuance, and trading of securities
issued by a public company are governed by the Securities and Exchange Act.
3. The listing regulations set forth by TSEC and GTSM together with the Company Act,
Securities and Exchange Act, and other ordinances for public companies can help and
guide listed companies in the establishment, implementation and practice of corporate
governance system.
The independent director and supervisor system is a significant part of corporate
governance in Taiwan. As regulated by Taiwan's Company Act, a public limited
company is required to have a board of directors with 3 directors at least, and 2
supervisors at least (Company Act, 2006, Chapter V, Section 4). The listing regulations
stipulate that a company applying for listing the first time must have no less than five
directors, and set aside certain seats for an independent director and a supervisor (Taiwan
Securities and Exchange Act, 2006, Article 26-3). Those provisions also specify the
qualifications and independent status of such directors and supervisors.

Until the

enactment of the amended "Securities and Exchange Act" in 2006, all the listed
companies are required to appoint independent directors not less than two in number and
not less than one-fifth of the total number of directors (Taiwan Securities and Exchange
Act, 2006, Article 14-2). Additionally, a listed company shall establish either an audit
committee or a supervisor (Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act, 2006, Article 14-4).

Reforms of Taiwan's Corporate Governance
Since Berle and Means in 1932, the American academic community has been
exploring the issues of corporate governance. The topic caught on with Asian countries
in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis.

In order to reform Taiwan's corporate

governance system through integrated planning and gradual movement, the Securities
and Futures Commission (which has become Securities and Futures Bureau since July 1,
2004) has launched "The Project for Planning, Promotion, and Implementation of
Corporate Governance System in Taiwan. In July 2003, "The Group for Implementing
Corporate Governance

(the "Group")", comprised of representatives from the Taiwan

Securities Exchange Corporation ("TSEC"), the GreTai Security Market ("GTSM), the
Securities & Futures Institute ("SFI"), other compliance authorities, industries concerned,
and academic institutions, were organized to propose various plans aiming at establishing
a corporate governance system consistent with international trends and domestic needs.
As a result, seven aims and 27 action items have been implemented. Among them, the
aims of "Assistance to Enterprises on Establishment of their Corporate Governance
Culture and System" and "Improvement of Board of Directors' Professional Capability
on Business Operation", and the actions of "Research and Proposal of Independent
Directors and Independent Supervisors Election System", "Review of Qualification and
Independence for Independent Directors and Supervisors", and "Research and
Promulgation of Guidelines for Promotion of Advanced Studies by Directors,
Supervisors of TSECIGTSM Listed Companies" are especially significant (TSEC, 2006).

Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSECIGTSM Listed Companies
(CGBPP)

Referring to comments and suggestions from all relevant government agencies
and the private sectors, the Group reviewed the proposed "Corporate Governance
Best-Practice

Principles for TSECIGTSM Listed Companies"

promulgated its amended version through the year 2003.

(CGBPP), and

Additionally, the Group

announced on February 16, 2003 reference samples including the rules governing board
meetings. In sum, the purpose of promulgating CGBPP is to assist TSECIGTSM listed
companies to establish a sound corporate governance system, and to promote the integrity
of the securities market. Accordingly, there are five principles a TSECIGTSM listed
company shall follow:
1.

Protect shareholders' rights and interests;

2.

Strengthen the powers of the board of directors;

3. Fulfill the function of supervisors;
4.

Respect stakeholders' rights and interests;

5. Enhance information transparency. (CGBPP, 2002, Article 2)

Thereafter, in CGBPP, Chapter I11 "Enhancing the Function of Board of
Directors", the structure of the board of directors, the independent directors , audit
committee and other functional committees, rules for the proceedings of board meetings
and the decision-making procedures, and fiduciary duty, duty of care and responsibility
of directors are recommended for inclusion in the company's corporate governance
system.

Summary

In the literature review, a comprehensive understanding of the origin of corporate
governance, the exploration of various corporate governance systems in the world, the
important issues of corporate governance system, and the relationship between
independent directors, board effectiveness, and company performance, is profiled through
the existing theoretical studies. Empirically, most of the studies concerning independent
directors and board independence are not found to be significantly and positively related
to company performance.

However, research of variables such as directors' training,

board process, board task performance, board cohesiveness, and board effectiveness are
valuable for developing an effective board process to benefit the governance
effectiveness and company performance.

Particularly, the model of board effectiveness

and the theory of board processes, which are integrated and synthesized with the studies
of group decision-making will definitely expand the research dimensions of corporate
governance to human behavioral science (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).
Moreover, in order to explore the independent director mechanism already
implemented in Taiwan's corporate governance system, the related literature and
governmental regulations, such as TSEC's "CG Report", CGBPP, Taiwan's Company
Act, and Securities and Exchange Act, are reviewed comprehensively as well.

For

future studies, many subjects in corporate governance practices like the information
disclosure, board structure, board characteristics, board meeting, board effectiveness and
company performance are all significant.

First of all, independent directors and

company performance and board training in TSEC listed companies were selected for this
study.

Theoretical Framework

The major theories that guided this study consisted of theories of corporate
governance, independent director and company performance.

The theoretical literature

began with the concept of corporate governance encompassing independent directors,
board effectiveness, board structure, board process, directors' characteristics, and
company performance (Detomasi, 2002; Banks, 2004; NYSE,2002; NASDAQ, 2002;
Standard & Poors, Rating Criteria, 2004). Next, the theoretical literature explored the
relationship among these variables (Anonymous, 2006; Leblanc & Gillies, 2003;
Westphal, 1999; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Bhagat and Black, 2002). Finally, the
theoretical literature reviewed the reform of corporate governance in Taiwan
encompassing the implementation of governance laws and regulations of the listed
companies, such as independent director and board training (TSEC, 2006).

A schematic

model (Figure 2) depicts the relationships among the major theories and variables in this
study.
Characteristics

Financial
Performance

Independent
Directors

Directors'
Training

Figure 2. Hypothesized model of the relationships between board characteristics and
company performance, tested in this study.

The proposition that director independence is beneficial to corporate governance
and company performance has become conventional wisdom (Anonymous, 2006). The
investors and regulators not only in the U.S. but also in the other countries with different
corporate governance systems embrace the belief to reform corporate governance.
Taiwan's corporate governance has been under such reform during the past few years
since an independent director was required in the listing rules in 2002. In the same year,
in order to strengthen director competencies and behaviors for better board effectiveness,
board members were advised by the listing regulations to take certified advanced training
courses in management functional and firm-specific field (CGBPP, 2002). Thus, board
training is also regarded as related to corporate governance and company performance,
which is examined as well as independent director in this study.
Research Question

1. Are there significant differences in financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of
TSEC listed electronic companies according to the presence or absence of
independent directors?
Hypotheses

1. There are significant differences in the financial performance (ROA, ROE, EPS) of
TSEC listed electronic companies according to the number of independent directors
as follows: three independent directors > two independent directors > one
independent director > 0 independent director.

2. The number of director training hours significantly explains financial performance of

TSEC listed electronic companies.

3. The number of independent directors and the number of board training hours are

significant explanatory variables of financial performance (ROA, ROE, EPS) of
TSEC listed electronic companies.

Chapter I1 presented a literature review of key concepts in this study. The main
gap is that empirical literature is scant comparing the effect of the number of independent
director on company performance of TSEC listed electronic companies since the
regulation of independent director was inaugurated in 2002. The highest number of
independent directors for all of the TSEC listed companies is four in January 2006, and
only one company has four independent directors (TSEC, 2006). Thus, it is significant
to compare the four levels of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3). Moreover, there is
no empirical literature examining the effect of the number of board training hours on
company performance since board members were advised to take advanced training, and
their certified numbers of training hours were required to be disclosed on the TSEC
website publicly. The theoretical framework focusing on independent director, board
training, and company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS, provides a
synthesizing conceptual organization for this study.

Chapter I11 presents the

methodology used to answer the research question and test the hypotheses.

CHAPTER 111
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Chapter 111 presents a description of the methodology used in this exploratory
(comparative) and correlational (explanatory) study about the relationship between
number of independent directors and board training hours and company performance in
terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS. The research question and hypotheses, which appear at
the end of Chapter 11, evolve from gaps in the literature that need to be examined.
Chapter I11 begins with a discussion of the research design.

The sampling plan,

instruments, procedures and data collection methods, evaluation of ethical aspects of the
study, and methods of data analyses are presented. This chapter concludes with an
evaluation of the research methods used in this study.
Research Design
The research design used in this study was a non-experimental, quantitative,
causal-comparative (exploratory), and correlational (explanatory) design using secondary
analysis of data. The secondary data of the number of independent directors, board
training hours, and company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS were obtained
from the TSEC official website and publicly disclosed information of listed companies
reported to TSEC.

he design examined the effect of the presence or absence of

independent directors on company performance, and the explanatory relationships
between the number of board training hours and the number of independent directors on
company financial performance.
Based on the literature review, although numerous quantitative studies have
examined the relationships between independent directors and company performance

(Westphal, 1999; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003; Bhagat & Black, 2002; Chen, Elder & Hsieh,
2005), none of studies clearly examined independent directors emphasizing comparisons
and relationships between number of independent directors since the regulation was
enacted in 2002 in Taiwan.

Since there is only one listed company which has four

independent directors for the board of directors in Taiwan and none have more than four,
it is significant to compare financial performances of those companies having one, two,
or three independent directors respectively.

Furthermore, no study was found to

examine the relationship between the number of board training hours and company
performance, although board members' training of listed companies was advised by
TSEC in 2002, and the number of board members' certified training hours were required

to be reported to the same authority.
The dependent variable in this study was company performance, defined by
ROA, ROE, and EPS. These three indicators have been commonly used to measure a
company's financial performance academically and practically.

All of the listed

companies must follow the listing regulation to disclose certified financial reports
including these figures quarterly, semi-annually, and annually for financial transparency
(Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act, 2006, Article 36).
The independent variable of the Research Question was the presence or absence
of independent directors (0 or more than 1). The independent variable in Hypothesis 1
was independent directors in the boardroom measured by group.

There were four

groups compared (0, 1,2, and 3) for the TSEC listed companies. One company had four
independent directors in the boardroom and was excluded from this study.
Hypothesis 2 included one independent variable (board training hours) and the

dependent variable of company performance.

Board training was measured by the

number of completed training hours for all board members of a company, which is
updated and reported to TSEC once a month. Company performance was measured by
the company's three financial indicators (ROA, ROE, and EPS). Hypothesis 3 included
two independent variables, the number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3), and the
number of board training hours and the dependent variable of company performance
measured by three financial indicators (ROA, ROE, and EPS).
In this study, the causal-comparative (exploratory) design aimed to examine the
differences between independent variables and dependent variables for the research
question and Hypothesis 1. A two-group comparison using three separate independent
t-tests was used to compare three financial performance indicators (ROA, ROE, and EPS)
according to the presence or absence of independent directors (the TSEC listed electronic
companies having none, or one or more independent directors).

A four-group

comparison using three separate ANOVAs with post hoc comparisons was used to
compare company financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) according to four groups
(companies having 0, 1,2, or 3 independent directors).
For Hypotheses 2 and 3, the correlational (explanatory) design used the value of
one or two independent variables to explain variation in the value of three separate
measures of the dependent variable (financial performance indicators of ROA, ROE, and
EPS).

For hypothesis 2, three separate simple regression analyses examined the

explanatory relationship between the number of director training hours (independent
variable) and each of the ROA, ROE, and EPS financial performance indicators
(dependent variable).

For hypothesis 3, three separate multiple regression analyses

examined the explanatory relationship between two independent variables (the number of
director training hours and the number of board of directors) and three separate measures
of the dependent variable (company financial performance of ROA, ROE, and EPS).
Population and Sampling Plan

Target Population
According to Gay and Airasian (2000), the population that the researcher would
ideally like to generalize is referred to as the target population.

In this study, the target

population was the electronic public companies currently listed on Taiwan Stock
Exchange Corporation (TSEC).

As of August 9, 2006, there were 304 electronic

companies listed on TSEC (TSEC, 2006).
Accessible Population
The population that the researcher can realistically select from is referred to as the
accessible, or available, or study population (Babbie, 2004; Gay & Airasian, 2000). As
of August 9, 2006, all of the 304 listed electronic companies were accessible for this
study, their company profiles and information regarding corporate governance are
disclosed and updated every month on the TSEC website. Therefore, the accessible
population was the same as the target population.
To answer the question and examine the hypotheses, 304 public electronic
companies listed on the TSEC as of August 9, 2006 were selected as the sample to
examine the number of independent directors, the number of board training hours, and
company performance in terms of ROA, ROE and EPS. They were posted on the TSEC
website in the corporate governance and financial reports sections respectively.

Sampling Plan

The entire target population of TSEC electronic companies constituted the final
data producing sample for secondary data analysis of independent directors, board
training, and company performance. No sampling plan was designed.
Eligibility Criteria

All companies were included in the sample of the research if they met all of the
following criteria:
1. Must be a listed electronic company on TSEC as of August 9, 2006 that discloses its
financial annual reports for the year of 2005 for testing the question and hypotheses.
2. Must be a listed electronic company on TSEC as of August 9, 2006 that reported and
posted its number of independent directors and its number of board members' training
hours on the TSEC website as of the end of 2005.
Exclusion Criteria

1. The only company in the sample having 4 independent directors in the boardroom
was excluded from analysis.
2. As of August 9, 2006, 15 companies in the sample that did not disclose financial
performance indicators for the year of 2005 were excluded.
Data Producing Sample

Of the 304 public electronic companies listed on the TSEC as of August 9, 2006,

16 companies were excluded from analysis. This resulted in a final data producing
sample of 288 companies (See Appendix A).

Instrumentation

The information on the official TSEC website regarding the number of
independent directors discloses only companies having at least one independent director.
Those companies having no independent director are not on the list. Therefore, the
research question can be examined by comparing two groups (absence or presence of
independent directors). To test Hypothesis 1 and 3, the secondary data on the official
TSEC website in January 2006 regarding the number of independent directors (0, 1,2, or

3) of listed electronic companies was selected and analyzed to measure the differences in
financial performance according to the number of independent directors.

To test

Hypothesis 2 and 3, the secondary data of TSEC regarding the certified training hours of
board members as at the end of 2005 were selected and analyzed. In addition, the
secondary data of ROA, ROE, and EPS from the same data source of TSEC, which links
to the listed companies' financial reports for the year of 2005, were selected as the
measures. They are updated every month, and can be regarded as one of the most reliable
public sources accessible.
The Taiwan Stock Exchange Company (TSEC) provides a Market Observation
Post System (M.O.P.S.) which discloses listed companies' public information for stock
investors and stakeholders.

In the Corporate Governance section of M.O.P.S., the

number of independent directors and board members' training hours as of the end of 2005,
since 2002 when the regulation implemented, can be searched. The financial reports of
listed companies can be searched through linking the individual company's website.
Company code, company name, absence or presence of independent directors (EXIND),
number of independent directors (NOIND), board members' training hours (BTHS),

ROA, ROE, and EPS of the individual listed electronic company were collected and
listed in Appendix A as the data for analysis.
Number of Independent Directors (Independent Variable)

All of the listed companies are required to appoint independent directors not less
than two in number and not less than one-fifth of the total number of directors effective
from the beginning of 2007 (Taiwan Securities and Exchange Act, 2006, Article 14-2).
Nevertheless, the highest number of independent directors for all the listed companies
was four as of the end of 2005.

Moreover, only one company had four independent

directors. The only company with four independent directors was excluded from the
sample group. All the other listed companies appointing independent directors had less
than 4 in number (0, 1, 2, or 3). Therefore, in this study, the number of independent
directors was selected to measure the independent variable.
To examine the Research Question, all of the TSEC electronic companies were
analyzed by two groups (absence or presence of independent directors).

To test

Hypothesis 1, the number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, or 3) was selected to compare
variances in company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS.

To test

Hypothesis 3, the number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, or 3) was selected to examine
the explanatory relationship between the number of independent directors, board training
hours, and company performance (ROA, ROE, EPS).
All of the listed companies are required to report their information regarding the
number of independent directors to TSEC, and then post on the website.

The

information is oversight by the government and the shareholders; therefore, the reliability
and validity of the data exist and have been commonly used to conduct research of

corporate governance issues in Taiwan (Chen, Elder & Hsieh, 2005).

Board Training Hours (Independent Variable)
Board members of listed TSEC companies are advised by CGBP regulations to
"participate in training courses of finance, business, commerce, accounting or law, which
cover subjects relating to corporate governance upon becoming directors and throughout
their terms of occupancy" (CGBPP, 2002, Article 40 & 51). Hence, board training
should be related to corporate governance, board effectiveness, and company
performance. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 and 3 were formed to examine the explanatory
relationship between board training hours and company performance.
To measure board training, all of the board members' training hours taken
through certified training institutions and reported to TSEC, were used in this study. On
M.O.P.S. of TSEC, board members' training hours are disclosed, posted, and updated
when board members take the certified training courses regarding corporate governance.
According to TSEC Regulation Governing Information Reporting by Listed Companies
(2005), the listed company is required to report the board members' information of any
changes including continuing education record by the 15th day of each month for the
preceding month.

The information has oversight by investors, shareholders, and

supervising officials.

Company Financial Performance (Dependent Variable)
In this study, to measure the dependent variable of company performance for the
Research Question and Hypotheses 1 and 2, return on total assets (ROA), return on equity
(ROE), and Earnings Per Share (EPS) were selected.

These measures have been

commonly used in academic or market practice as well (Westphal, 1999; Ghosh &

Simmons, 2003).
ROA = Net Income + Interest Expense (net of tax) I Average Total Assets
ROE = Net Income I Average Stockholders' Equity
EPS

=

(Net Income - Preferred Dividends) 1 Weighted Average Number of Common
Shares Outstanding

According to TSEC Regulation Governing Information Reporting by Listed
Companies (2005), the listed company is required to report its audit or review report
prepared by the certified public accountant (CPA), and name of the CPA. The deadline
for annual data is four months from the close of each fiscal year. Therefore, the
reliability and validity of the CPA audited data of ROA, ROE, and EPS on the listed
company's annual report do exist.
Procedures: Data Collection Methods and Ethical Considerations
1. In this study, the secondary data were collected from the official TSEC website,

which is publicly disclosed.

The number of independent directors and board

members' training hours of listed electronic companies as of the end of 2005 was
searched in the Corporate Governance section of M.O.P.S. on the TSEC website.
2. ROA, ROE, and EPS of listed electronic companies for the year of 2005 can also be
searched in the Financial Reports section on the TSEC website which links to the
annual financial report of the individual companies.
3. Being an official public website source, the TSEC database is available for all and
free to use.

4. Upon approval of Lynn University's IRB, the data collection process was initiated.
(See Appendix C).

5. Permission Letter to reprint the Board Effectiveness Model by Richard Leblanc and
James Gillies (Figure 1 of this dissertation) is listed in Appendix B.
Methods of Data Analysis
The data collected from secondary sources was analyzed by using SPSS for
Windows version 11.0 to test the Research Question and Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. For
the Research Question, to determine if there is a significant difference in financial
performance that the absence or presence of the independent directors in a listed
company really affects their financial performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS,
three independent-sample t-tests were used for analysis. For Hypothesis 1, to determine
if any of four different groups of companies with 0, 1, 2, or 3 independent directors
differs significantly from each other on the financial performance in terms of ROA, ROE,
and EPS, three separate ANOVAs with post hoc comparisons were used for analysis.
For Hypothesis 2, to examine if the number of board training hours significantly explains
financial performance of the TSEC listed electronic companies, three simple regression
analyses were used for analysis. For Hypothesis 3, to examine if there is explanatory
relationship between the number of independent directors and the number of board
training hours, and company performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS), three separate multiple
regression analyses were used.
Evaluation of Research Methods
This was a non-experimental study. This study was examined for internal and
external validity by addressing the strengths and weaknesses of research methods.
Strengths of this study's design are addressed systematically as follows:

1. A quantitative research method in this study is a strength because the official

secondary data can be used to examine the question and test hypotheses in a
less-studied area, the effect of the absence or presence of independent directors and
the training of boards of directors on company performance.
2. Through consulting various academic and practical experts including Professor T. C.

Yang of National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan, Professor C. H. Tsao of Leader
University, and Miss Elaine Lin, Secretary General of Corporate Governance
Association, the secondary data from the official TSEC is one of the more reliable
and commonly used sources to collect the data needed for examining corporate
governance related issues.
3.

Due to the accessibility of secondary data on the TSEC website and the individual
company's website, the entire target population could be used as the unit of analysis,
limiting sampling bias, and strengthening external validity.

4. A causal-comparative design involving two independent groups (listed electronic
companies appointing the independent director, or not) and one dependent variable of
company financial performance (with three financial performance indicators), was
appropriate to answer the Question using the independent-sample t-test method.

5. Causal-comparative study involving four independent groups (listed electronic
companies having 0, 1, 2, or 3 independent directors) and one dependent variable of
company financial performance (with three financial performance indicators), was
appropriate for testing Hypothesis 1 using the one-way ANOVA method.

6. Explanatory correlational study using multiple regression analysis to examine the
relationship between two independent variables and three dependent variables was
appropriate for testing Hypothesis 3.

7.

Content validity was established because ROE, ROA and EPS are commonly
implemented for measuring company performance academically and practically.

8.

Because the disclosure of independent directors, board members' training and
financial transparency are required by government regulations and reviewed by
various stakeholders such as monitoring authorities, investors and stock market
researchers, the reliability and validity of data on the official website and CPA
audited financial report do exist.
Weaknesses of this study's design are addressed systematically as follows:

1. More context variables should be examined to show the influence of these variables

with the number of independent directors, directors' training programs, and on
company financial performance.
2. Although the independent director's appointment in the boardroom has been required
by the regulation since 2002, for the initial implementation period until the end of
2006, it is not enforced but advised only. Some companies may perform very well
financially, but they may not appoint independent directors.
Chapter 111 presented the research methodology related to the research question
and hypotheses concerning the absence or presence of the number of independent
directors, board training hours, and company performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and
EPS for TSEC electronic companies.

This chapter included a description of the research

design, the sampling plan, instrumentation, data collection procedures, and methods of
data analysis. Chapter IV presents the results of this study.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results of this study concerning independent directors and company
performance, and board training in TSEC electronic companies are presented in Chapter

IV. To answer the research question and test the hypotheses, methods of data analyses
included descriptive and inferential statistics, consisting of independent t tests, ANOVA
with post hoc comparisons, simple regression, and multiple regression analyses.

Research Question
Are there significant differences in financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS)
of TSEC listed electronic companies according to the presence or absence of independent
directors?

Independent Director's Appointment and Company Performance:
Independent Sample t Test
In this study, to examine and answer the research question, three separate
independent sample t tests were used to compare the means of ROA, ROE, and EPS
according to the absence or presence of the independent directors of TSEC listed
electronic companies. Due to the exclusion criteria, 288 companies were examined out
of the 304 accessible companies. The 288 companies were separated into two groups
according to the absence or presence of independent directors. As shown in Table 1, the
analyses of the independent samples t-tests indicated that the 122 companies with the
absence of independent directors had a mean of 2.4 for ROA, of 1.0 for ROE, and of 1.2
for EPS. The 166 companies with the presence of one and more independent directors
had a mean of 8.1 for ROA, of 11.8 for ROE, and of 2.7 for EPS respectively.

Additionally, the t-tests revealed that the presence of independent directors for TSEC
listed electronic companies resulted in significantly higher financial performance than
companies without independent directors for ROA
p

=

.002),and EPS (t

=

-3.24, p

=

(1 =

-4.02, p

=

,000). ROE

(1 = -3.22,

,001). Levene's test for equality of variances

indicated variances for the two groups of ROE differed significantly from each other
(.004). Therefore, it would be necessary to use the unequal variance result of the t-test.

Table I
Numbers, Means, and Independent t, and p of Absence or Presence of Independent
Directors by ROA, ROE, and EPS

Absence or Presence of Independent
N
Directors
ROA Absence of independent directors
122

ROE

EPS

Mean
2.4

Presence of one, or more than one
166
independent directors

8.1

Absence of independent directors

1.O

122

Presence of one, or more than one 166
independent directors

11.1

Absence of independent directors

1.2

122

Presence of one, or more than one 166
independent directors

t

P

-4.02

.OOO

-3.22a

.002

-3.24

.001

2.7

dAdju~tedI for unequal variances

Hypothesis 1
There are significant differences in the financial performance (ROA, ROE, EPS)
of TSEC listed electronic companies according to the number of independent directors as
follows: three independent directors > two independent directors > one independent

director > 0 independent director.

The Number of Independent Directors and Company Performance:
ANOVA and Post Hoc Comparisons
As shown in Table 2, of the entire 288 companies, there were 122 companies
without any independent director; of the 166 companies with independent directors, 37
companies with one independent director presence, 107 companies with two independent
directors, and 22 companies with three independent directors. This was an unbalanced
distribution of companies per group, heavily represented by companies with 0 directors
and 2 directors. The ROA means for the four groups (0, 1, 2, 3) were 2.41, 6.27, 8.14,
and 10.71 respectively.

The ROE means for the four groups were 1.04, 7.61, 12.13, and

16.79 respectively. The EPS means for the four groups are 1.16, 2.41, 2.53, and 3.85
respectively. As the number of independent directors increased, it was observed that the
ROA, ROE, and EPS also increased.

These descriptive findings support the

hypothesized relationships that board member with 3>2>1>0. However, the sample size
for companies with one and three directors may be insufficient in size to reveal
significant differences.

Descriptive Statistics o f Four Groups with the Presence qf'lndependent Numbers of'
Independent Directors
--

Number of
independent.
Directors

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error

Minimum

Maximum

ROA

0
I
2
3

122
37
107
22

2.41
6.27
8.14
10.71

12.22
10.62
1 1.42
13.02

1.10
1.74
1.10
2.77

-42.00
-23.62
-43.12
-14.64

35.10
38.00
42.07
35.34

ROE

0
1
2
3

122
37
107
22

1.04
7.61
12.13
16.79

33.12
19.95
17.42
19.62

2.99
3.28
1.68
4.18

-147.89
-58.58
-6 1.20
-22.34

185.00
69.00
47.34
46.00

EPS

0

122
37
107
22
288

1.16
2.41
2.53
3.85
2.04

3.77
5.75
3.20
4.15
3.98

.34
.94
.3 1
.88
.23

-7.05
-7.54
-5.75
-2.4 1
-7.54

21.31
33.26
15.87
13.86
33.26

1
2
3
Total

To test Hypothesis 1, three ANOVAs were used to determine if any of the three
different company performance measures (ROA, ROE, and EPS) differed significantly
from each other according to the number of independent directors. The means of ROA,
ROE, and EPS differed significantly as shown in Table 3 ( F = 6.074, p

F = 4.682, p = .003 for ROE; F = 4.278, p

= ,006 for

=

.001 for ROA;

EPS). Consequently, hypothesis 1

was supported in part, that there were significant differences in the financial performance
(ROA, ROE, EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies according to the number of
independent directors.

ANOVA ofFour Groups with the Absence or Presence qf'Diffbrent Numbers of'
Independent Directors by ROA, ROE, and EPS

ROA

Between
Groups

Sum of Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

P

2538.647

3

846.216

6.074

.OO 1

9265.466

3

3088.489

4.682

,003

187346.267

284

659.670

197.514

3

65.838

4.278

,006

Within
Groups
ROE

Between
Groups
Within
Groups

EPS

Between
Groups
Within
Grou~s

As a result of significant differences between the groups, the rigorous Scheffe
post hoc test for individual pair wise comparisons was conducted and results are shown in
Table 4. This Scheffe post hoc test provided the opportunity to test sub hypotheses that
the differences in the financial performance (ROA, ROE, EPS) of TSEC listed electronic
companies according to the number of independent directors were as follows: three
independent directors > two independent directors > one independent director > 0
independent. The results of pair wise comparisons are discussed; however, it is noted
again, that the distribution of companies within the four groups was not even. Groups
with 0 and with 2 independent directors constituted the majority of the sample.

(1) For ROA performance, there were significant mean differences between the group of

companies with 0 independent directors and companies with two independent
directors, as well as the group of companies with 0 independent directors and the
group of companies with three independent directors (-5.73, p
=

=

.004 and -336. p

,026). However, there were no significant mean differences between the 0

independent directors and the one independent director group of companies (-3.86, p
=

,387). In sum, comparing with 0 independent directors, the ROA performance of

companies with only one independent director in the boardroom was lower than the
ROA performance compared with companies with two or three independent directors
in the boardroom.

While there was an increase in ROA corresponding to an increase

in the number of independent directors, there were no significant differences between
any two groups of companies with the presence of independent directors, such as one
independent director and two independent directors, one independent director and
three independent directors, as well as two and three independent directors. This
finding may be due to sample size in groups of two and three independent directors.
The sub hypothesis for ROA that three independent directors > two independent

directors > one independent director > 0 independent was not supported.
(2) For ROE performance, there were significant mean differences only between the
group of companies with 0 independent directors and the group of companies with
two independent directors (-1 1.09, p

=

.015). Therefore, there were no significant

differences between the group of companies with 0 independent directors and the
group of companies with one or three independent directors. In addition, there were
no significant differences between any two groups of companies with the presence of

independent directors, such as one independent director and two independent
directors, one independent director and three independent directors, as well as two
independent directors and three independent directors. There were no significant
differences in the ROE performance of TSEC electronic companies with the absence
or presence of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3), although there were the only
significant differences between the absence of independent and the presence of two
independent directors. This finding may be due to sample size in groups of two and
three independent directors. . The sub hypothesis for ROE that three independent
directors > two independent directors > one independent director > 0 independent was
not supported.

(3) For EPS performance, there were significant mean differences only between the
group of companies with 0 independent directors and the group of companies with
three independent directors (-2.68, p

= .0034).

Therefore, there were no significant

differences between the group of companies with 0 independent directors and the
group of companies with one or two independent directors (-1.25, p
=

=

.411; -1.37, p

.075). In addition, there were no significant differences between any two groups

of companies with the presence of independent directors, such as one independent
director and two independent directors, one independent director and three
independent directors, as well as two and three independent directors (-.12, p

= .999;

- 1 . 4 3 , ~= .604; - 1 . 3 1 , ~= .561).
There were no significant differences in the EPS performance of TSEC
electronic companies with the absence or presence of independent directors (0, 1, 2,
and 3), although there were the only significant differences between the absence of

independent and the presence of three independent directors. This finding may be
due to sample size in groups of two and three independent directors. The sub
hypothesis for EPS that three independent directors > two independent directors >
one independent director > 0 independent was not supported.
In sum, the above three findings indicated there are no significant differences in
the financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC electronic companies with the
absence or presence of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3), although there are
significant differences between the absence of independent directors and the presence of
independent directors. This finding may be due to sample size in groups of one and
three independent directors. The sub hypotheses for ROA, ROE, and EPS that three
independent directors > two independent directors > one independent director > 0
independent were not supported.

Post Hoc Comparisons of Significant Differences in ROA, ROE, and EPS by Using
Scheffe Test According to the Number of Independent Directors

Dependent
Variable
ROA

Number of
Independent
Directors
(1)

0

I
2
3

Number of
Independent
Directors
(J)
1
2
3
0
2
3
0
1
3
0

I
2

ROE

EPS

Mean
Difference
(1-J)
-3.86
-5.73)
-8.36)
3.86
-1.87
-4.50
5.73
1.87
-2.62
8.36
4.50
2.62

Standard
Error
2.21
1.56
2.73
2.2 1
2.25
3.17
1.56
2.25
2.76
2.73
3.17
2.76

P

,387
,004
.026
.387
,875
.572
.004
375
,824
,026
,572
.824

Hypothesis 2
The number of director training hours significantly explains financial
performance of TSEC listed electronic companies.
Board Training Hours and Company Performance:
Simple Regression Analyses

To examine Hypothesis 2, three simple regression analyses were used to explain
the relationship between board training hours and the company's performance for the 304
accessible companies. Due to the exclusion criteria, 288 companies were tested. In this
study, the dependent variables are ROA, ROE, and EPS, and the predictor variable is
board training hours.

As shown in Table 5, the mean values of board training hours,

ROA, ROE, and EPS were 45.45,5.67,7.21, and 2.04 respectively.
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviation for Board Training Hours and Company Performance by

ROA, ROE, and EPS

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

45.45

85.75

288

ROA

5.67

12.11

288

ROE

7.2 1

26.17

288

EPS

2.04

3.98

288

Board Training Hours

As shown in Table 6, the F values (5.156 for ROA, 4.220 for ROE, and 3.670 for
EPS) for the regression equations were significant (p = .024 for ROA, p
and p

=

.056 for EPS), although (p

=

= .041 for ROE,

.056 for EPS) was only slightly higher than

significance level (p < .05). The F value is the mean square regression divided by mean

square residual (George & Mallery, 2003). Therefore hypothesis 2 is supported.
Table 6

ANOVAs for Board Training Hours and Company Performance by ROA, ROE, and EPS
Dependent
Variables
ROA

ROE

EPS

Mean
5.67

7.2 1

2.04

Source of
Variation
Regression

Sum of
Squares
745.55

1

Mean
Square
745.555
144.61 1

df

Residual

41358.72

286

Total

42 104.27

287

2858.89

1

2858.894

Residual

193752.84

286

677.457

Total

19661 1.73

287

57.89

1

57.890

Residual

45 10.84

286

15.772

Total

4568.73

287

Regression

Regression

F
5.156

P
.024a

4.220

.04Ia

3.670

.056=

a Predictors: (Constant), Board Training Hours

As shown in Table 7, the t values (t = 2.271 for ROA,t = 2.054 for ROE,and t =
1.916 for EPS)for the individual regression equations were significant O)= .024 for ROA,
p = .041 for ROE,and p = .056 for EPS) except the slightly higher p = ,056 (> .05) for

EPS. The constant and coefficient of board training hours, as shown in Table 7,
indicated three regression models with constants (4.816 for ROA equation, 5.528 for

ROE equation, and 1.804 for EPS equation) and coefficients (0.019 for ROA equation,
0.037 for ROE equation, and 0.005 for EPS equation).

Table 7
Constants and CoeIficient.~of Board Training Hours jhr ROA. ROE, and EPS Equations

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Dependent Variables

ROA

ROE

EPS

B

Standardized
Coefficients

SE

Constant

4.816

,803

Board Training Hours

.0 19

,008

Constant

5.528

1.739

Board Training Hours

,037

,018

Constant

1.804

,265

Board Training Hours

.005

.003

I

P

Beta @)

,133

.I21

.I 13

5.994

.OOO

2.271

,024

3.179

,002

2.054

,041

6.800

,000

1.916

.056

In Table 8, the R, R ~ and
, adjusted R~ for the explanatory relationship between
board training hours and company performance by ROA, ROE, and EPS were presented.
The R~value is the proportion of variance in one variable accounted for (or explained) by
the other variable. Therefore, the three R2 values (.018 for ROA, .015 for ROE,
and ,013 for EPS) indicated the proportion of variance, that the individual regression
equations can be explained by using the board training hours, were respectively less than
2% of the variation in company performance. However, only one explanatory variable

was entered into the model. The adjusted R2 (.014 for ROA, .O11 for ROE, and .009 for
EPS), was less as expected. The number of board training hours significantly explains
about 1% to 1.5% of financial performance of TSEC listed electronic companies.

R, R', and Adjusted ~ ~ , fBoard
b r Trcrining Hours and Company Pecfijrmnnce by ROA,
ROE, and EPS

Adjusted R'

Dependent
Variables

R

R'

ROA

,133"

.O 18

.014

12.025

ROE

.12Ia

.O 15

.O 1 1

26.028

EPS

.I 13a

.013

,009

3.971

Std. Error of

the Estimate

a Predictors: (Constant), Board Training Hours

Hypothesis 3

The number of independent directors and the number of board of directors'
training hours are significant explanatory variables of financial performance (ROA, ROE,
and EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies.
Number of Independent Directors and Number of Board Training Hours and
Company Performance: Multiple Regression Analyses
Multiple regression analysis shows the influence of two or more variables on a
designated dependent variable.

In this study, multiple regression analysis was used to

examine the relationship between the number of independent directors and the number of
board training hours, and company performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS).
As shown in Table 9, in terms of the ROA performance, the F value (1 1.312) for
the overall regression equation was significant (p

=

,000). Hypothesis 3, that the

number of independent board of directors and the number of director training hours was
supported for the financial indicator of ROA. The adjusted ~'=.067 (coefficient of

determination, adjusted for sample size and the number of predictor variables) indicates
the regression equation using the two independent variables explained 6.7% of the
variation in the ROA performance.
To analyze the individual predictors, the t value, which is the regression
coefficient divided by the standard error (BISE), was significant for the number of
independent directors and the number of board training hours (t = 4.14, p

p

=

=

,000; t = 2.07,

.039). In terms of the relative influence, the number of independent directors was

more important than the number of board training hours @= ,237 >P= .119). Both were
positively related to ROA performance.

As a result, both of the independent variables

were significant in explanation of the dependent variable. Other board characteristics
variables need to be included in regression models to further explain financial
performance.

Table 9

Multiple Regressions of Number of Independent Directors and Number of Board
Training Hours and ROA Performance
Unstandardized
Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

t

P

1.79

.073

Beta (/I)

B

SE

ROA:
Constant

1.892

1.053

Number of Independent
Directors

2.741

.66 1

,237

4.14

,000

,017

,008

,119

2.07

,039

Number of Board Training Hours

N= 288
F=l1.3 12

df=2

p=.000

Adjusted ~ ~ = . 0 6 7

As shown in Table 10, in terms of the ROE performance, the F value (8.849) for
overall regression equation was significant (p = ,000). Hypothesis 3, that the number of
independent board of directors and the number of director training hours, was supported

2
the regression
for the financial indicator of ROE. The adjusted ~ ~ = . 0 5indicates
equation using the two independent variables explained 5.2% of the variation in the ROE
performance.
To analyze the individual predictors, the t value was significant for the number of
independent directors (t = 3.64, p

=

.000), but not significant for the number of board

training hours ( t = 1.87, p = ,062). In terms of the relative influence, the number of
independent directors was more important than the number of board training hours @
=

.210 > /3 = .108) in explaining ROE performance.

Table 10

Multiple Regression of Number of Independent Directors and Number of Board Training
Hours and ROE Performance
Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

t

P

-.03

,973

Beta (/3)

B

Std. Error

Constant

-.077

2.294

Number of Independent
Directors

5.254

1.441

.2 10

3.64

,000

.033

,018

,108

1.87

,062

ROE:

Number of Board Training Hours

N=288
F=8.849

df=2

p=.000

Adjusted ~ ~ = . 0 5 2

As shown in Table 1I , in terms of the EPS performance, the F value (7.529) for
overall regression equation was significant 0,= .001). Hypothesis 3, that the number of
independent board of directors and the number of director training hours was supported
for the financial indicator of EPS.

The adjusted R2=.044 indicates the regression

equation using the two independent variables explained 4.4% of the variation in the ROE
performance.
To analyze the individual predictors, the t value was only significant for the
number of independent directors (t = 3.355, p
of board training hours ( t = 1.743, p

=

=

.001), but not significant for the number

,082). In terms of the relative influence, the

number of independent directors was more important than the number of board training
hours@= .194>P= .101).

Table 11

Multiple Regressions of Number of Independent Directors and Number of Board
Training Hours and EPS Performance
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
EPS:
Constant

Std. Error
1.015

.35 1

,005

,003

Standardized
Coefticients

t

P

Ba@
et)'
2.889

,004

1.743

.082

Number of Independent
Directors
Number of Board Training Hours

N=288
F=7.529

dP2

p=.001

Adjusted R2=.044

,101

In sum, using three multiple regression analyses to examine Hypothesis 3, and
only two explanatory variables about board characteristics, findings indicated that the
number of independent directors and the number of board of directors training hours were
significant explanatory variables of financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of
TSEC listed electronic companies, and Hypothesis 3, was supported. The number of the
independent directors and board training hours was significant in explaining between 4%
and 7% of the ROA, ROE, and EPS performance, using the adjusted R ~ .The number of
the independent directors was significant in explaining each of the ROA, ROE, and EPS
indicators of financial performance.

Of the three financial indicators, the number of

board training hours was a significant explanatory variable of ROA only.
Chapter IV presented the results of data analyses including descriptive statistics,
independent-sample t tests, ANOVAs, simple regression analyses, and multiple
regression analyses. Findings showed there were significant differences in financial
performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies according to
the presence or absence of independent directors, using independent t-test (research
question 1). Furthermore, using ANOVA for differences in financial performance
(ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies according to 0, 1, 2, and 3
independent directors were significant as well (partly supporting hypothesis 1).
However, although there was a corresponding increase in financial performance (ROA,
ROE, and EPS) according to the number of board of independent directors, only
differences between 0 and 2 directors were significant.

These two groups also

constituted a majority of the sample. Therefore, the sub hypotheses of hypothesis 1 for
ROA, ROE, and EPS that three independent directors > two independent directors > one

independent director > 0 independent, was not supported.
Additionally, findings of simple regression analyses indicated that the number of
board training hours significantly explained about 1% of financial performance of TSEC
listed electronic companies. Results of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that
the number of independent directors and the number of board of directors training hours
were significant explanatory variables of about 7% of financial performance (ROA, ROE,
and EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies.

Chapter V provides a detailed

discussion of the findings in terms of interpretations, implications, conclusions, and
recommendations.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Summary
Many academic and investment market researchers in America believe that
independent directors should be more numerically dominant on public company boards
than they are today. Nevertheless, studies have found no significant evidence that
companies appointing a majority of independent directors in the boardroom perform
better than companies without such independent directors (Bhagat & Black, 2002).
Since the financial crises in East Asia (1997-98) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOA), the American market system of corporate governance is spreading all over
the world. In Taiwan, the enactment of the amended "Security and Exchange Act" in
2006 required all listed companies to appoint independent directors, not less than two in
number and not less than one-fifth of the total number of directors (Taiwan Security and
Exchange Act, 2006).
In order to explore the independent director mechanism already implemented in
Taiwan's corporate governance system, this study examined the effects of independent
directors and board training in TSEC electronic companies.

In this research,

independent directors were measured by the presence or absence of independent directors
and the number of independent directors in the boardroom. Board members' training
was measured by the training hours of the board of directors. Company performance
was measured by financial indicators in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS.
Using the official secondary data to examine the question and hypotheses,
findings indicated that the presence or absence of independent directors significantly

affected the company's financial performance for TSEC electronic companies.
Nevertheless, using the Scheffe Post Hoc comparisons, findings indicated there are no
significant differences in the financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of TSEC
electronic companies with different number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, and 3).
Furthermore, results of simple regression analyses indicated that the number of board
training hours significantly explains about 1% of financial performance of TSEC listed
electronic companies. Results of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the
number of independent directors and the number of board of directors training hours were
significant explanatory variables of about 7% of financial performance (ROA, ROE, and
EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies.

Chapter 5 presents the interpretations,

limitations, implications, recommendations, and conclusions concerning the independent
directors and company performance, and board training in TSEC electronic companies.

Interpretations

Research Question and Hypotheses
The research question and two hypotheses addressed the purposes of this study.
Specific purposes of this quantitative causal-comparative study were: (1) to determine if
there are significant differences in company performance between two groups of listed
Taiwanese electronic companies with the absence or presence of independent directors;

(2) to examine the effect of the number of independent directors (0, 1, 2, 3) on company
performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS, in TSEC electronic companies; (3) to
examine the explanatory relationship between board members' training and company
performance in terms of ROA, ROE, and EPS in TSEC electronic companies; and, (4) to

examine the explanatory relationship between the number of independent board directors
and the number of training hours and company performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS).

Research Question
For the Research Question, to determine if the absence or presence of independent
directors significantly affected the company's financial performance or not, findings
indicated that there were significant differences in company performance between these
two groups of listed Taiwanese electronic companies.

Nonetheless, the results are

questionable.
Bhagat and Black (2002) state, "An important issue in studying the correlation
between board composition and firm performance is the direction of causation.

Board

composition could affect firm performance, but firm performance can also cause the firm
to change its board composition" (p. 232).

In this study, using independent-sample

t-test, it was shown that the companies having independent directors do have better
company performance, although the direction of causation is still uncertain.

While the

appointment of independent directors is not yet enforced by law, companies performing
outstandingly likely prefer to appoint independent directors for their reputation only, not
because independent directors actually could help the business operation. Conversely,
companies performing poorly likely prefer not to appoint independent directors in order
to keep the company's operation in the cabinet of the mysterious board.
Therefore, it may not be the competencies of independent director that benefit the
company performance, the relationship between independent directors and company
performance is endogenous (Bhagat & Black, 2002). "Board independence could affect
future firm performance, but a firm's need for a particular board structure, the firm's past

performance and other factors could also affect the firm's future board composition"
(Bhagat & Black, 2002, p. 236).
While the need for independent directors or even independent boards (a majority
of directors are independent) has become conventional wisdom of corporate governance,
commentators "often differ over what constitutes director independence and how it
effectuates the aims of corporate governance reform" (Anonymous, 2006, p. 1).
Hypothesis 1 focused on the effect of the number of independent directors.
Hypothesis 1
Using ANOVA for differences in financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) of
TSEC listed electronic companies according to 0, 1, 2, and 3 independent directors were
significant as well (partly supporting Hypothesis 1).

Although there was a

corresponding increase in financial performance (ROA, ROE, and EPS) according to the
number of board of independent directors, only differences between 0 and 2 directors
were significant.

These two groups also constituted a majority of the sample.

Therefore, the sub hypotheses of Hypothesis 1 for ROA, ROE, and EPS that three
independent directors > two independent directors > one independent director > 0
independent, was not supported.
There are possibilities that don't favor the effectiveness of more independent
directors on company performance. One possibility, as stated in the previous section, is
that their relationship is endogenous. A second possibility is that independent directors
need more incentives to complete monitoring and advisory tasks for the company, such as
greater share ownership, or stock options (Fich & Shivdasani, 2005). For example,
Bhagat and Black (2002) indicate "there is some evidence that greater share ownership

may improve independent directors' performance" (p. 246). A third possibility is that
"today's independent directors are not independent enough" (p. 246). Companies need
independent directors to be not only superficially independent of management but also
substantially accountable to shareholders (Bhagat & Black, 2002).

A fourth possibility is that some independent directors "are beholden to the
company or its current CEO in ways too subtle to be captured in customary definitions of
independence" (Bhagat & Black, 2002, p. 246). For instance, independent directors
may be the CEO's college classmates, or they may be employed by a foundation
receiving financial aid from the company.

A fifth possibility is that independent

directors are not assigned to an appropriate committee which reflects their individual
expertise. For example, an independent director with human resources expertise is
assigned to the audit committee that needs more financial expertise.

One other

possibility is that independent directors may be at a disadvantage when they do not have
particular expertise, such as close knowledge background of the company's industry
(Bhagat & Black, 2002).

Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3
Board members' training is implemented in order to reinforce directors' business
capability, which should lead to an enhancement of board effectiveness and company
performance. Using simple regression analyses for Hypothesis 2, the number of board
training hours as an explanatory variable of the company's financial performance was
supported, and findings indicated that the number of board training hours significantly
explains about 1% of financial performance of TSEC listed electronic companies. For
Hypothesis 3, findings of multiple regression analyses demonstrated that the number of

independent directors and the number of board of directors training hours were
significant explanatory variables of about 7% of financial performance (ROA. ROE, and
EPS) of TSEC listed electronic companies.
To encourage directors' continuous learning and training, the TSEC conducted
research and promulgated "Guideline for Promotion of Advanced Study by Directors and
Supervisors of TSECJGTSM Listed Companies" (TSEC, 2006). In the guideline, a
newly recruited director of TSEC listed companies is advised to take at least 12 hours of
training courses for the recruiting year, and at least 3 hours for each of the following
years of tenure.
It is difficult to build an effective board without effective directors. "There are
three factors which constitute an effective director: (i) director independence, (ii) director
competencies, (iii) director behavior" (Leblanc & Gillies, 2003, p. 7). Measures of
director competence "include the directors' general, functional, firm-specific and
board-specific knowledge and skills. Relational, social and intellectual capacity or
capability may also be included as competence" (Huse, 2005, p. 8). As reported by
Huse (2005), Sundaramurthy and Lewis claimed the dynamism of actual board behavior
and corporate governance is rooted in various learning and influencing loops. Besides,
"the learning processes take place at various levels: societal and institutional,
organizational, group and individual" (Huse, 2005, p. 9).
Consequently, effective board training needs to be explored in terms of the types
of training programs, such as subject design, training methods, evaluation of training, and
motivation of training. In particular, to meet the individual company's requirement,
custom-made training programs would be better than generalized courses, which were

mostly adopted and reported by the companies examined in this study. In general,
besides training hours, more measures examining directors' training are needed for
advanced study.
Practical Implications

1. An effective board needs independent directors to benefit the company not only
directly for better financial performance but for its reputation of compliance with the
government regulation and the functioning of objective monitoring.

2. The effectiveness of independent directors must be built on their competencies and
behavior as well, not just on his or her regulatory independence status.
3. The absence or presence of independent directors affects a company's financial

performance, but there is no significant evidence that appointing more independent
directors may enhance company's financial performance in this study. Therefore, an
independent board with a majority of independent directors may not necessarily be
essential to good corporate governance.

4. For government regulations, the over-emphasis on board structure should be
augmented by enhancing director competencies and behavior.

5. There was no empirical support for current government regulation that companies are
required to appoint independent directors, not less than two in number and not less
than one-fifth of the total number of directors (Taiwan Security and Exchange Act,

2006).

6. Results of simple regression and multiple regression analyses indicated that
independent directors and board training hours are significant in explaining financial
performance of TSEC electronic companies. The implementation of board training

needs to be reinforced and emphasize the variety and quality of the training program.
Conclusions

1. The proposition that director independence is beneficial to corporate governance and
company performance has become conventional wisdom.

The investors and

regulators not only in the U.S. but also in other countries with different corporate
governance systems embrace this belief to reform corporate governance.
2.

In this study, although the companies having independent directors do have better
company performance, the direction of causation is still uncertain.

It may not be

the competencies of an independent director that benefit the company performance;
the relationship between independent directors and company performance may be
endogenous. Independent directors could affect future company performance, but
a company's need for a particular board structure, the company's past performance
and other factors such as government regulation could also affect the company's
appointment of independent directors.
3. Overall, within the range of independent directors appointed in TSEC electronic

companies, there is no significant evidence that appointing more independent
directors may enhance company's financial performance.

Particularly, there is no

empirical support for current government regulation that companies are required to
appoint independent directors, not less than two in number and not less than
one-fifth of the total number of directors.

4.

The board members' training is implemented to reinforce directors' business
capability, which should enhance board effectiveness and company performance.
In this study, results of simple regression and multiple regression analyses indicated

that independent directors and board training hours are significant in explaining
companies' financial performance.

To enhance the explanation for better

effectiveness and financial performance, board training needs to be explored in
terms of the type of training programs, such as subject design, training methods,
evaluation of training, and motivation of training.

5. Empirical studies in the literature and in this study demonstrate that quantitative or
statistical correlations between company performance and variables of corporate
governance don't get to the causality of what leads to good corporate governance.
Focusing on what happens behind the board curtain through qualitative research
methods may be more beneficial for building good corporate governance.
Limitations

1. Research of independent directors, board training, and company performance is
limited to the listed electronic public companies in Taiwan, which have a hybrid
corporate governance model approaching the American market model.

2. The history of independent directors and board training has not been long and not
enforced since it was set forth for Taiwan's listed companies in 2002; therefore, the
implementation of the regulations is still developing.

3. To measure company performance in this study, only three financial indicators (ROA,
ROE, and EPS) were used.

There are other criteria which may be used, from

financial dimensions such as EVA (Economic Value Added), PIE ratios, market value
of stocks, and from social dimensions such as social responsibility indicators, and
environmental protection compliances under the hybrid corporate governance system,

4. The quality of board training as measured by the types of training programs, training

methods, and subject matters, may perform as significantly as the quantity of training
hours. Quality of board training was not researched in this study.
5. Due to the limitations of time and manpower, exploratory research using qualitative

methods such as interviews and observations to collect the perceptions of the relevant
respondents toward independent directors and board training was not conducted in
this study.

Recommendations for Future Study

1.

The implementation of regulations with regard to an independent director's
appointment has not been long in Taiwan. It is necessary in the hture to examine
the evolution of effects of these regulations by using longitudinal research instead of
the cross-sectional research used in this study.

2. To measure company performance in this study, only three financial indicators (ROA,
ROE, and EPS) were used. There are still some other criteria which may be used for
future study from financial dimensions such as EVA (Economic Value Added), PIE
ratios, market value of stocks, or social dimensions such as social responsibility
indicators, and environmental protection compliances under the hybrid corporate
governance system.

3. Future research should assess the independent director's compensation system to
demonstrate the effect of incentives, such as share ownership and stock options, on an
independent director's performance.

4. The corporate governance literature has begun to examine closely the behavioral
aspects and group processes that underlie board dynamics, but more studies in the

future regarding board processes, particularly by using a qualitative method or a
mixed method, are still needed.

5 . Besides board training hours, more measures examining the effects of board training
on board effectiveness and company performance are needed for the future study of
corporate governance.

6. For better corporate governance, the implementation of independent director and
board members' training needs to be incorporated into other mechanisms such as the
settings of board meetings, and meetings of the audit committee, the nomination
committee, and the compensation committee.

These factors can be regarded as

independent or context variables to be examined in the future.

7. In this study, listed electronic companies were selected as the population to conduct
the research. However, it is possible for industry-based differences among boards of
directors to affect their functioning as groups.

Comparing the performance of

independent directors in various industries is needed in future studies.

8. In Taiwan, more process-oriented research on corporate governance is needed in the
hture, rather than the over-emphasis on board structure found in past research.

9. The operation and performance of Taiwan's enterprises are closely related to their
investments in mainland China.

Therefore, research should be conducted in

enterprises in which Taiwanese firms have invested in mainland China.
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Appendix A
Secondary Data From TSEC

* Data incomplete

EXIND (0,I): the existence of independent directors in the boardroom (independent
variable)

NOIND (1,2,3): the number of independent directors in the boardroom (independent
variable)

BTHS: the number of completed board members' training hours
ROA, ROE, and EPS: financial indicators
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